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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Keith Dean Clark appeals from his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. Clark challenges the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Clark was stopped by law enforcement for failing to have a light affixed to 
his person or his bicycle while riding it at night. 1 (11/08/2010 Tr., p.8, L.14 -
p.10, L.21.) A subsequent search led to the discovery of a butterfly knife, a roach 
clip, and a baggie of methamphetamine in Clark's shoe. (PSI, pp.1-2, 43-44.) 
The state charged Clark with possession of a controlled substance, carrying a 
concealed weapon and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.23-24.) 
Clark filed a motion to suppress "any and all evidence seized from 
Defendant and any and all admissions, statements, and/or confessions made by 
and/or attributed to Defendant at the time of his arrest" asserting the officer "had 
no reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop" because Clark was 
holding a flashlight at the time of the stop and, Clark contended, "a hand-held, 
light-emitting device sufficiently abides by Idaho Code§ 49-723, as said device is 
attached to the cyclist's hand while being held." (R., pp.30-31.) At a hearing on 
the motion, Clark testified he had a flashlight "hanging from his wrists" and held it 
1 I. C. § 49-723 provides: 
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-903, Idaho 
Code [from sunset to sunrise], shall be operated with a light 
emitting device visible from a distance of at least five hundred (500) 
feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the rider, and with a 
reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle. 
1 
in his hand between his fingers while riding his bike so the light pointed forward. 
(11/08/2010 Tr., p.5, L.2 - p.6, L.8.) The officer testified Clark did emit a light to 
the front, but as he passed Clark and his companion the officer "observed that 
the male, Mr. Clark, was holding a flashlight in his hand." (11/08/2010 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.7-12.) The officer further testified he saw nothing attaching the flashlight to 
Clark's person. (11/08/2010 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-21.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Clark's motion to 
suppress, finding: 
The police officer testified that the reason he pulled Mr. Clark 
over was because it appeared to him that he didn't have a light 
affixed to himself or to the bike as the law requires, and that's why 
the officer pulled him over in the first instance. 
Even if it turned out that that light was actually affixed to the 
bike, as long as the officer had a good-faith belief that it looked to 
him like he was holding onto it and that that's the reason that he 
pulled him over, he was entitled to pull him over and check that out. 
Now, Mr. Clark's contention that the light was attached to his 
wrist by a string, maybe so and maybe not. The police officer has 
testified that he, the police officer, didn't see the rope or the string, 
the loop. I take it it was some kind of a loop. Right? 
But nevertheless, the officer testified that he, in fact, did not 
see the flashlight attached to the wrist of the defendant. 
The court does have some discretion to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses who have testified, and on balance, I find that the 
officer's testimony strikes me as being more credible than the 
testimony of the defendant in this case. 
I acknowledge the fact that it's possible that I'm wrong about 
that, that perhaps the officer just forgot that there was a string 
attached to it. But I don't believe that the officer is lying when he 
says that he did not see the flashlight attached to the hand or to the 
wrist. 
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Therefore, he was entitled to pull him over and check that 
out. Frankly, even if he found that it turns out that it was attached 
either to the bike or to the body of the driver, he still - the officer 
was still entitled to pull him over and check that out. So that was 
reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop that I understand 
ripened into the further detention, and so forth. 
(11/08/2010 Tr., p.12, L.8 - p.13, L.3.) 
Clark entered a conditional plea to possession of a controlled substance, 
reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, and the state 
dismissed the two remaining charges. (12/07/2010 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.23, L.2.) 
The court placed Clark on a five-year period of probation with an underlying 
unified sentence of five years, with the first year fixed. (3/08/2011 Tr., p.50, L. 9 
- p.51, L.3; R., pp.59-64.) 
Clark timely appeals. (R., pp.67-69.) 
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ISSUE 
Clark states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Clark's motion to suppress 
because Officer Dennis lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe 
Mr. Clark violated the law that requires a bicyclist to have attached to his 
person or bike a light to illuminate his path during certain hours of the day 
because Officer Dennis observed Mr. Clark holding a flashlight properly 
illuminating the road before initiating the stop? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Clark Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Clark's motion to suppress, finding that the officer 
had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Clark based on his belief that Clark 
did not have a light attached to his bike or his person as required by statute. 
Clark argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding the officer had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him for riding his bicycle in the dark while 
holding a flashlight in his hand because, he contends, that clearly met the 
requirement of the statute requiring illumination. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) 
Clark's claim fails. A review of the record, in light of the applicable legal 
standards, supports the district court's determination that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Clark. As such, the district court did not err when it 
denied Clark's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). 
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The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Clark Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981 ). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause. kl at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 
(1968); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must 
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person .... [TJhe evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
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analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
and law enforcement training."). 'Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 
1210 ( citations omitted). 
Idaho Code § 49-723 requires an individual riding a bicycle at night to 
operate the bicycle "with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at least 
five hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or rider .... " In 
denying Clark's motion to suppress, the district court concluded "there was 
reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop in the first instance." (11/08/2010 
Tr., p.14, Ls.14-15.) In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that "holding 
onto the flashlight is not the same as having the flashlight attached to the rider" 
(11/08/2010 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-15) and such failure to have a light attached 
"arguably is a violation of the statute that prohibits riding a bicycle without a light 
affixed" (11/08/2010 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-19). The district court found the officer 
believed Clark was merely holding onto an unattached flashlight while riding his 
bicycle at night and as such possessed reasonable suspicion that Clark was 
operating his bicycle in a manner inconsistent with statute and was "entitled to 
pull him over and check that out." (11/08/2010 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-21.) 
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The district court's rationale and conclusion are consistent with the 
applicable legal standards. The interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of a statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 
721 (2003). Those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning 
and the statute must be construed as a whole. l_Q_,_ "Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Locke, 
149 Idaho 641, 642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 
(Ct. App. 2000)). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly 
stated in the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
at 362, 79 P.3d at 721; Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. 
Clark's position on appeal is because "his light was visible to others for the 
proper distance," he was in compliance with the statute and the officer incorrectly 
"believed that the law required more." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) However, the plain 
language of the statute requires "a light emitting device visible from a distance of 
at least five hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the rider." 
I.C. § 49-723 (emphasis added). The requirement of an attached light source is 
unambiguous and is consistent with Clark's position that the "purpose of the 
statute is to have a light to illuminate the path in front of the bicyclist." 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) The best way to ensure the rider's path remains 
illuminated is to have a stationary light source, much like motorized vehicles, and 
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not rely on an individual's ability to hold a light source in one hand while 
continually operating a bicycle in the dark with the other. The plain language of 
the statute requires illumination from an attached light source. The district court 
correctly determined the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Clark based on 
his belief that Clark was riding a bicycle at night with an unattached light source 
in violation of I.C. § 49-723. 
Finally, Clark asserts "the rule of lenity requires that [I.C. § 49-723] be 
interpreted in [his] favor," thus leading the Court to conclude "holding a flashlight 
would be sufficient to be in compliance with the law." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The rule of lenity, however, applies only if a criminal statute still remains 
ambiguous after applying all other rules of statutory construction. State v. Beard, 
135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (2001 ); Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 
P.2d at 688. The rule of lenity is not applicable in this case because, as noted 
above, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires a light 
emitting device be attached to a bicycle or a bicycle rider. See I.C. § 49-723. 
Clark's unsupported argument that "the Legislature did not require more than that 
a person illuminate a path while riding a bicycle during certain hours of the day" 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10) ignores the actual language of the statute requiring 
the light source be "attached to the bicycle or the rider" (I.C. § 49-723). 
Clark has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress based on the court's finding of sufficient reasonable suspicion 
to stop Clark for his failure to comply with Idaho law requiring him to have an 
attached light source when riding his bicycle at night. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
district court's order denying Clark's motion to suppress. 
Dated this 5th day of January 2012, 
\J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of JANUARY 2012 served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
DIANE M. WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
NLS/pm 
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